Abstract The cMix scheme was proposed by Chaum et al. in 2016 as the first practical set of cryptographic protocols that offer sender-recipient unlinkability at scale. The claim was that the cMix is secure unless all nodes collude. We argue that their assertion does not hold for the basic description of cMix, and we sustain our statement by two different types of attacks: a tagging attack and an insider attack. For each one, we discuss the settings that make the attack feasible, and then possible countermeasures. By this, we highlight the necessity of implementing additional commitments or mechanisms that have only been mentioned as additional features.
Introduction

cMix
The cMix protocol by Chaum et al. [1] is an improved mixing network [2] which aims to provide an anonymous communication tool for its users at large scales. The mixing should be such that no one is able to relate an output message to a user input message, that is, no one is able to link a sender with a recipient. An important advantage over its predecessors is that cMix performs expensive computations (like public key encryption) during a precomputation phase, keeping the real-time phase, which is in charge with actual message delivery, fast. The protocol is a part of a larger system, called Privategrity, but its authors describe cMix independently.
The authors of Ref. [1] claim that cMix is the first practical system that provides sender-recipient unlinkability, unless all nodes collude. We argue that Tagging Attack. The cMix paper [1] introduces commitments [12] to overcome tagging attacks. The paper states that "tagging attacks do not work before the exit node", and "if a tagging attack is detected, at least the last node should be removed from the cascade" [1, Section 4.3] . Therefore the authors might be aware of a possible attack that can be performed by the exit node. However, they do not consider any prevention for this. We introduce a simple tagging attack launched by the exit node. Although a prevention mechanism is immediate (by adding an extra commitment) we consider it for completeness, as an example of a possible tagging attack against the system. In personal communications, the authors of cMix acknowledged that the actual design of the system adds the additional commitment we refer to as a countermeasure [13] .
Insider Attack. The cMix paper [1] claims that attacks are unsuccessful unless all nodes collude. We contradict this by showing that the last node can break the unlinkability, essentially by creating a mix network consisting of itself only. The attack will succeed by the last node deviating from the protocol rules and choose its own output. We argue that this attack remains undetected in the original version of cMix, and becomes detectable only if additional checks like Randomized Integrity Checking (RPC, see Subsection 2.3) are considered (suggested by the authors of [1] as a special feature). We show the necessity of using randomized partial checking (RPC). However, an inappropriate use of RPC could allow a coalition of nodes (all except one) to link a large fraction of the senders to their recipients.
Outline
Section 2 describes the cMix scheme and presents the adversarial model. The two following sections contain our results: Section 3 describes a simple tag attack similar to the tag attack described in the original cMix paper [1] . Section 4 presents the insider attack where the adversary controls the last node and makes the overall mixing process independent of the preceding nodes. Section 6 concludes and indicates possible future research directions. Figure 1 describes the cMix protocol from [1] . We ignore the return steps, since they are irrelevant for our attacks. Note that this does not restrict the applicability of our results, since the same permutation is used for both forward and return paths. Once the permutation is disclosed both directions of communication are compromised.
Preliminaries
cMix Description
cMix has two phases: a precomputation phase and a real-time phase. By design, the heavy public key computations are performed in the precomputation phase, which can be performed on separate hardware (for each node). Since the precomputation phase does not require any input from the users it can be performed offline and while a batch is being filled up with messages.
The scheme consists of a sequence of n mix nodes that process β messages at a time (a batch of messages); made simple, each node performs a permutation on the input and blinds the output by multiplying it with a random value. The last node N n makes an exception, as it usually behaves differently from the other nodes (see Figure 1) .
Besides the last node there is another entity with a special role in the system -the network handler -that interacts both with the users and the whole set of nodes. The network handler receives messages from the users and arranges them into batches; once a batch is full it is sent to the first node in the mix network. After the last node performs its mixing it sends the batch back to the network handler, which can then forward or broadcast the messages to the destination. The mixing should be such that no one is able to relate an output message to a user input message, that is, no one is able to link a sender with a recipient.
Before using the system each sender U j must establish a private symmetric key with each of the nodes N i , which they use as a seed in a pseudorandom generator to derive the secret keys k i,j . To blind a message M j before it is sent to the network handler, user U j multiplies M j with a key composed by the derived keys shared with each of the nodes K j = n i=1 k i,j . The network handler arranges messages into a batch and sends it through the mix network. Each node applies its permutation to the batch and the last node sends it back to the network handler. The output is a permuted batch of messages.
During the mixing step of the precomputation phase each node performs encryption under a public key of the system; the related private key is split across
Precomputation Phase
Step 1 (preprocessing). Each node Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, selects a random ri, computes the encryption E(r −1 i ) and sends it to the network handler. The network handler computes the product of all the received values, produces E(R
i ) and sends it to the first node.
Step 2 (mixing). Each node Ni, Step 3 (postprocessing). Using the random component x, each node Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, computes its individual decryption share for (x, c) as Di(x) = x −e i , stores it locally to use in the real-time phase and publicly commits to it.
Real-Time Phase
Step 0. Each user constructs its message M K −1 j (for slot j) by multiplying the message Mj with the inverse of the key Kj and it sends it to the network handler, which collects all messages and combines them to get a vector M × K −1 .
Step 1 (preprocessing). Each node Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends ki × ri to the network handler, which uses them to compute
ki × ri and sends the result to N1.
Step 2 (mixing). Each node Ni,
where Π0 is the identity permutation and S0 = 1. The last node Nn sends a commitment to its message Πn(M × Rn) × Sn to every other node.
Step 3 (postprocessing). Each node Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, sends its precomputed decryption share for (x, c) = E((Πn(Rn) × Sn) −1 ) to the network handler, while the last node Nn sends its decryption share multiplied by the value in the previous step and the message component: Πn(M × Rn) × Sn × Dn(x) × c. Finally, the network handler retrieves the permuted message as [1] all nodes in the network. The encryption scheme suggested by the authors of [1] is the multi-party group-homomorphic encryption based on ElGamal [14] described by Benaloh [15] . Moreover, all computations of the protocol are performed in a prime order cyclic group G that satisfies the decisional Diffie-Hellman security assumption. We denote by G * the set of nonidentity elements in G.
Refer to Figure 1 for the detailed self-contained description of the cMix process, using the notation defined in Table 1 .
Adversarial Model
The adversarial model in [1] assumes authenticated channels among the mix nodes and between the network handler and each mix node. This implies that the adversary can read, forward, and delete messages, but not modify, inject, or replay messages without detection. The adversary can compromise the users (up to all except two), and the mix nodes (up to all except one). Compromised nodes can behave malicious but cautious, since the attacker aims to remain undetected. Within this attacker model, the authors of cMix claim that the output is unlinkable to the input, even if the adversary knows the set of senders and the set of recipients for every batch of messages.
The security analysis in the Appendix A of the cMix paper assumes secure authenticated channels for which the adversary cannot read the content, only the length of a message. All our attacks hold under these stronger security assumptions.
Features and Extensions
The cMix paper [1] dedicates a section to special features and extensions of the system. It shortly discusses the utility of adding RPC (Randomized Integrity Checking) to cMix, an integrity check mechanism introduced by Jacobsson, Juels and Rivest [16] , and further analyzed and developed in Refs. [17, 18] . The usage of RPC in the cMix system is that each node commits to a randomly chosen permutation, publishes its input and output, and validates that it has followed the protocol correctly by revealing a (large) fraction of its secret input/output pairs, where these pairs are selected by the other nodes (or by a random oracle). The cMix system protects the user's privacy by putting nodes in pairs, such that each node belongs to only one pair. Nodes in a pair reveal their secret information such that none of the messages can be followed from the input of the first node to the output of the second node.
The Tagging Attack
Our first attack is similar to the tag attack described in the cMix paper [1] , but it uses a different value to remove the tag. During the precomputation phase the nodes compute the value (x, c) = E((Π n (R n ) × S n ) −1 ), where the last node stores the vector of message components, c, locally and sends the vector of random components, x, to all other nodes. Each node computes its decryption share using x and commits to this value. Note that it is uncertain whether c is being committed to or not in the description of the basic cMix protocol.
The authors of cMix introduce commitments to detect potential tagging attacks exposing any attempt of using the decryption shares to remove the tag. However, the commitments are independent of c, so it is possible to perform a similar attack which uses c instead of D n (x) to remove the tag. The downside is that the adversary needs to corrupt the last node (which has access to c) and the Goal: Tag a message Mj belonging to user Uj and recognize it in the permuted batch of messages, linking the sender Uj to its recipient.
Step 1. The corrupted node Nn creates a tag vector t which consists of β − 1 ones and one tag t ∈ G * in slot j (i.e. t = (1, . . . , 1, t, 1, . . . , 1) ), computes kn × rn × t and sends it to the network handler (Real-time Phase.
Step 1).
Step 2. The network handler sends the set of all decryption shares {Di(x)|1 ≤ i < n} to the last node (Real-time Phase.
Step 3). Node Nn can retrieve the permuted messages as
Di(x) × c and recognize the tagged message in slot j .
Step 3. The corrupted node Nn creates the inverse tag vector t −1 , which consists of β − 1 ones and one tag t −1 ∈ G * in slot j , computes c = c × t −1 , and sends Πn(M × Rn) × Sn × Dn(x) × c to the network handler. For the tag attack to be successful we need to assume that it is possible to recognize valid messages in the output. To tag a message M j the last node creates a tag vector t = (1, . . . , t, . . . , 1), where t is in position j, multiply it with the keys and random values k n × r n × t, and sends the result to the network handler. The tag then goes though the mixnet attached to message M j and arrives at the last node as Π n−1 (M × R n × t) × S n−1 . Then the last node can permute and do the computations according to the protocol, and publish its commitment to the value Π n (M × R n × t) × S n . This triggers all other nodes to send their decryption share to the network handler, which forwards them to N n . The last node can then retrieve the batch of permuted messages and find the invalid message M j t in slot j of the permuted batch. The last node creates the inverse tag t −1 , which has t −1 in slot j , and replaces the message components with the altered value c = c × t −1 . The network handler then computes
and delivers the permuted batch as normal. That is, the adversary has successfully linked a sender with a recipient without being detected. To make this attack detectable, the last node should publish a commitment to the vector of message components c in the Precomputation Phase.
Step 3, or the system should implement RPC as an integrity check mechanism. Although prevention can be simply achieved by natural solutions like the ones mentioned, we introduce the attack for completeness; it stands as an example of tagging attack performed by the last node, a type of attack the authors of cMix seem to be aware of (see [1] , Section 4.2: "tagging attacks do not work before the exit node" and "if a tagging attack is detected, at least the last node should be removed from the cascade").
At the time of writing, the authors of cMix acknowledged that the actual design of the system implements the countermeasure we refer to and commits to the vector of message components c, as explained above [13] .
The Insider Attack
Our second attack allows the last node to ignore all permutations introduced by the previous nodes and perform the overall mixing process by itself. Hence, the output of the real-time phase will be a batch of messages permuted with a known permutation making it easy to link all senders and recipients. To succeed, the adversary needs to corrupt the last node (which controls the output of the mixing process) and the network handler (which knows the content of the values E(R −1 n ) and M × R n , under the assumption of secure authenticated channels). Figure 3 describes the insider attack.
During Precomputation Phase.
Step 1 the corrupted network handler computes and sends E(R −1 n ) to the first and the last nodes. The honest nodes operates as normal, where the last, dishonest, node discards the input it receives from the previous node and chooses its own output. The last node draws a random vector A = (A 1 , . . . , A β ), encrypts the inverted values, E(A −1 ), and computes
n ×A −1 )). The last node publishes the random components, that is x, of π n (E(R −1 n × A −1 )) = (x, c) to the other nodes such that they can prepare their decryption shares.
In Real-Time Phase.
Step 1 the network handler sends M × R n to the first and the last nodes. In the mixing step the last node discards what it receives from the previous node, selects its output π n (M × R n × A), commits to this batch of messages, and sends π n (M × R n × A) × c × D n (x) to the network handler. As the network handler receives the decryption shares from the other nodes it can retrieve the permuted messages and forward them to the receivers:
Note that the output batch is only permuted with the permutation π n , which is known to the last node. Hence, the adversary can easily deanonymize all of the senders by applying π n −1 to the output. The RPC mechanism ensures with high probability that each node follows its instructions, hence, this will prevent the last node from deviating from the protocol. Since our insider attack changes the entire batch, RPC will detect the attack with overwhelming probability. This shows the necessity of implementing RPC with cMix.
Goal: Perform the mixing process with only the last node using only a known permutation to permute the batch of messages.
Step 1. The network handler computes and sends E(R −1 n ) to the first and last node (Precomputation Phase.
Step 1). The last node discards the input it is given form the previous node and publishes the component of random elements of πn(E(R −1 n ×A −1 )), for a random and invertible A (Precomputation Phase.Step 3).
Step 2. The network handler computes and sends M × Rn to the first and last node (Real-Time Phase.
Step 1). The last node discards the input it is given form the previous node, publishes a commitment to πn(M × Rn × A), and sends πn(M × Rn × A) × c × Dn(x) to the network handler (Real-Time Phase.
Step 3).
Step 3 Notes on the RPC mechanism. RPC makes the nodes reveal a (large) fraction of their secret information, which could break the anonymity of the users [18] . As an example, let us assume that each node performs only one permutation and proves the correctness of its output for this permutation. Further assume that an adversary corrupts all except one, honest, node and therefore only needs the permutation from this node to deanonymize the users. When using RPC, the honest node would reveal information about its permutation. Hence, the adversary can easily break the anonymity for a substantial portion of the users using the information made public by the RPC mechanism. Even in the scenario where there are two honest nodes that are paired, the adversary can get some information about the senders and receivers [18] . Nodes in a pair reveal information such that no messages can be followed from the input of the first node to the output of the second node in a pair. This means that if a message, say M j , is revealed by the first node, then it will not be revealed by the second node (see Figure 4) . Given enough rounds of cMix, an adversary might eventually link senders and recipients that are frequently talking with each other. Therefore, two honest nodes (a single pair) are usually not enough to protect the anonymity of all users.
Rebuttal from the Authors of cMix
The authors of the original cMix paper [1] made the following rebuttal to the initial submission of this paper:
[...]Galteland, Mjølsnes, and Olimid propose a tagging attack and an insider attack against the cMix protocol, as described in the preliminary cMix eprint [1] . But security mechanisms specified in this preliminary cMix eprint prevent both attacks. In addition, alternative integrity mechanisms (e.g., trap messages) specified in the current cMix paper [19] provide additional ways to prevent these attacks. In particular, as presented in the preliminary cMix eprint, Random Partial Checking (RPC) [17] prevents both attacks. [...] The tagging attack does not work because RPS prevents it, as explained in the preliminary cMix eprint [1, Section 7.3] . In addition, cMix stops the attack by commitment: it commits to the value the Galteland et al. allege makes the tagging attack possible. Our system design and prototype implements this commitment, even though the original cMix eprint does not mention this detail. Before reading the paper by Galteland et al., we were aware of this attack and of similar ones. After coming across an earlier version of their paper [20] , we contacted the authors to inform them that our design and implementation included commitments to prevent these types of attacks, which they do acknowledge. We disagree with their claim that we overlooked important details underlying these alleged attacks. The attacks proposed by Galteland et al. do not work: security mechanisms specified in the preliminary cMix eprint prevent both attacks.
As a response to their remarks, both our attacks are valid under the basic protocol description given in [1, Section 4] . The commitment mechanism required to overcome the first attack is not used or referred to in the original paper, as acknowledged in the authors' response. Furthermore, the cMix paper describes RPC as an extension, therefore usage of RPC can hardly be understood as necessary [1] . We claim the necessity of RPC or an equivalent mechanism. RPC is not included in the formal analysis, hence it is left outside the security theorems and performance discussions, while we find that RPC is crucial for the security of the system, and might introduce a significant performance penalty. The response note informs us that proper security mechanisms protecting against the attacks we have presented are used in their prototype and explained in a new paper, but both of those are currently unavailable to us for inspection.
Conclusions
We demonstrate by examples that the cMix scheme, as it was initially defined in its basic settings, would allow linkability between senders and recipients, hence compromising the anonymity of the users. We describe the actions an adversary could follow to succeed for both types of attacks (the tagging attack and the insider attack). The attacks succeed in the secure authenticated channels settings, and under the assumption that the adversary can corrupt the network handler. This is a natural assumption that was also made by that the authors of cMix.
By discussing the attacks, we highlight the necessity of the use of commitments and the RPC integrity mechanisms, which have only been mentioned as additional features in cMix scheme, and where these mechanisms are not fully included in the security proofs. However, the authors of cMix have expressed that their demonstration software implements the commitment mechanism that prevents our tagging attack. This paper is restricted to a theoretical exposure of some attacks against the cMix standalone set of cryptographic protocols. Future analysis work can include experimental activities for practical attacks on real-world cMix implementations. Of course, the scalability of performance, throughput, and latency are key issues. An enterprising theoretical work would be to analyze the cMix security within the context of the larger system Privategrity.
